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RECENT CASES
Bankruptcy-Transfers-Drawee Bank Not Liable
for Payment of Depositor's Check After His
Voluntary Petition in Bankruptcy Where Notice Is
Not Given to Bank
After its depositor had filed a voluntary petition in bankruptcy,
but before it had received notice of the bankruptcy, defendant bank
paid five checks which had been drawn by the depositor before the
filing of the petition. The trustee in bankruptcy applied to the
referee1 for a turnover order2 requiring the bank to pay to the trustee
the amount of the checks, and in the alternative asking the same
relief from the payee of the checks. The trustee alleged that since
a voluntary petition is tantamount to an automatic adjudication,3 the
payment of the checks constituted a transfer in behalf of the bankrupt
after the date of bankruptcy in violation of section 70(d) (5) of the
Bankruptcy Act.4 The referee's determination that the bank and the
payee were jointly liable to the trustee was affirmed by the district
court and the court of appeals On appeal to the Supreme Court of
the United States, held, reversed. Where a bank has neither knowl-
edge nor notice of bankruptcy proceedings, the bank is not liable
under section 70(d) (5) of the Bankruptcy Act for the amount of
1. Referees are officers of the court, appointed by judges of the bankruptcy court.
The determinations of the referee are subject to review by the judge, but absent obvious
abuse the referee's decisions are usually allowed to stand. After his appointment, the
referee calls a meeting of the creditors of the bankrupt at which a trustee is elected,
or-if the creditors fail to elect a trustee-appointed by the referee. The trustee's duties
are to "collect and reduce to money the property of the estates for which [he is
trustee], under the direction of the court, and close up the estates as expeditiously
as is compatible with the best interest of the parties in interest." 11 U.S.C. § 75 (a)
(1) (1964). See generally, 8 W. CoLLImE, BANmrPTcy, g 5.01-04 (14th ed. 1966)
(hereinafter cited as Cormun).
2. A turnover order in this situation is reimbursement. If the transfer were to be
held invalid, the bank would owe the trustee the amount of the checks, as title to the
money vested in the trustee when the petition was filed. 11 U.S.C. § 110(a) (1964).
The power to reclaim a bankrupt's assets which have been invalidly transferred is
granted under 11 U.S.C. § 110(e)(1),(2) (1964). A turnover order may apply
to any type of property in the bankrupt's estate and will require the property to be
turned over to the trustee. 2 CoLL , ff 23.10.
3. The filing of a voluntary petition operates as automatic adjudication of bankruptcy.
See 11 U.S.C. § 41(f) (1964).
4. 11 U.S.C. § 110(d)(5) (1964). The section provides that "[except for certain
real property transactions dealt with in another section of the act and the provisions
of this section] no transfer by or in behalf of the bankrupt after the date of bank-
ruptcy shall be valid against the trustee."
5. Bank of Matin v. England, 352 F.2d 186 (9th Cir. 1965). See 52 VA. L. Bxv.
528 (1966); 65 MIcHr. L. REV. 195 (1966).
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a bankrupt depositor's funds transferred after the filing of a voluntary
petition in bankruptcy. Bank of Matin v. England, 385 U.S. 99 (1966).
The Bankruptcy Act6 was enacted to provide for the prompt and
equitable7 distribution of the assets of a bankrupt's estate. Originally
the Act vested title to all the bankrupt's property in the trustee in
bankruptcy8 at the time of adjudication; 9 however, to prevent deple-
tion of the estate in the period between the filing of the petition and
adjudication the courts held that the title of the trustee related back
to the time the petition was filed.10 This interpretation resulted in
inequities to persons who dealt with the bankrupt prior to adjudica-
tion without notice of the filing of the petition and led to inconsistent
decisions by the courts." Provisions in the Chandler Act of 193812
remedied these inconsistencies. While section 70(a) of the Act 13
adopts the relation-back doctrine and provides that title vests in the
trustee upon the filing of the petition, section 70(d) protects certain
enumerated transfers14 of property by parties acting in good faith15
between filing and adjudication. However, with the exception of
6. 11 U.S.C. § 1 (1964). The Constitution provides: "Congress shall have power
to establish . . . uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies throughout the United
States." U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8. For a thorough discussion of the history of the
Bankruptcy Act, see H. REmwGTON, BAmmUPTCy, §§ 1-15 (5th ed. 1950).
7. Equitable powers are conferred on the bankruptcy court by statute. These powers
will govern where the Bankruptcy Act is silent, but are to be exercised within the limits
laid down by the act. 11 U.S.C. § 11(a) (1964). See SEC v. United States Realty &
Improvement Co., 310 U.S. 434 (1940); Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939).
Examples of the use of the equitable powers include: Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292
U.S. 234 (1934) (creditors enjoined from prosecuting claims in state court); Dearborn
Elec. Light & Power Co. v. Jones, 299 F. 432 (1924) (execution of deed com-
pelled); Cross v. Georgia Iron & Coal Co., 250 F. 438 (1918) (bankrupts estate
protected from fraudulent assessment). See also 1 COLLmR 11 2.09 at 171.
8. 11 U.S.C. § 110(a) (1964).
9. The Bankruptcy Act, ch. 541, § 70(a), 30 Stat. 565 (1898).
10. 4 CoLwE ff 70.66; 65 Mica. L. REv. 195, 198 (1966).
11. Cunningham v. Merchants' Nat'l Bank, 4 F.2d 25 (1st Cir. 1925); Citizens'
Union Nat'l Bank v. Johnson, 286 F. 527 (6th' Cir. 1923); In re Zotti, 186 F. 84
(2d Cir. 1911).
12. 52 Stat. 881 (1938). This act was a general revision of the original Bankruptcy
Act of 1898.
13. 11 U.S.C. § 110(a) (1964).
14. Persons transfering property of the bankrupt for a "present fair equivalent value"
after filing and either before adjudication or before a receiver takes possession of the
property of the bankrupt are protected. 11 U.S.C. § 110(d) (1) (1964). Those holding
property of the bankrupt or indebted to the bankrupt are protected if they pay such
indebtedness or transfer the property in good faith to the bankrupt or to his order.
11 U.S.C. § 110(d) (1964).
15. 11 U.S.C. § 110(d)(3) (1964). This clause states that one will not be deemed
to act in good faith if he has actual knowledge of the pending bankruptcy, unless "he
has reasonable cause to believe that the petition in bankruptcy is not well founded."
As is pointed out in 4 COLLmR [ 70.68, at 1508- "This provision clearly takes away the
protection of § 70(d) from those who know of the bankruptcy petition, and except
possibly as to the relief granted the rare individual who can prove his 'reasonable cause
to believe that the petition in bankruptcy is not well founded,' the statutory requirement
does not differ essentially from the cas6,law prior to 1938."
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certain real property transactions,16 transfers of property after adjudi-
cation are not protected.17 Thus, since section 70(d) applies only to
transfers after filing and before adjudication, it affords no protection
for innocent parties dealing with the property of a bankrupt who has
filed a voluntary petition, as the filing of such a petition operates as
automatic adjudication.' 8 After adjudication, all persons are con-
sidered to have knowledge of the proceeding, since adjudication is
said to be notice to the world to refrain from dealing with the
bankrupt's estate.19 However, many debtors, such as banks and other
holders of the bankrupt's assets, will generally receive actual notice
of the proceeds after adjudication through the trustee's efforts
to gather the assets of the bankrupt. Thus, whether an innocent
bank or other party in interest will avoid an apparently invalid
transfer after the filing of a voluntary petition will ultimately depend
on the diligence of the trustee.20 Since creditors are a major concern
of the Bankruptcy Act, mandatory notice requirements are provided
for them on such occasions as the first meeting of creditors after
adjudication and the sale of the bankrupt's property.21 However,
there has been no case in which the trustee has been denied recovery
of property transferred after adjudication because of his failure to
give timely notice to a debtor or other holder of the bankrupt's
assets.22 In Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., the
Supreme Court held that due process requires that in order to bind
any person who has a substantial property interest in a proceeding
an effort must be made to give him reasonable notice. The Court
further stated that reasonable notice may have to be personal notice,
regardless of the form of the proceedings.24 The Supreme Court has
16. See 11 U.S.C. § 44(g) (1964).
17. Section 70(d) of the Bankruptcy Act excludes transactions after adjudication or
after the appointment of a receiver. In Lake v. New York Life Ins. Co., 218 F.2d
394 (4th Cir. 1955) the insurance company was forced to pay to the trustee the
cash surrender value of policies which the insurance company held as security for
loans made in good faith to the bankrupt after the receiver had taken possession of
the bankrupts property. The court held the loans were not a protected transaction
under 70(d).
1 18. "The filing of a voluntary petition . . . shall operate as an adjudication with
the same force and effect as a decree of adjudication." 11 U.S.C. § 41(f) (1964). This
was an amendment passed in 1959. Prior to that time, transfers after adjudication
had been held invalid where the filing of the voluntary petition and adjudication took
place on the same day. See Ripp v. Fleming, 242 F.2d 849 (7th Cir. 1957).
19. 4 CoLIn E 70.68, at 1505.
20. In the instant case, the trustee waited six days before notifying the bank.
21. 11 U.S.C. § 94 (1964).
22. 65 MlaIO. L. REv. 195, 197 (1966).
23. 339 U.S. 306 (1950). The case involved notice to non-resident beneficiaries of
a settlement of a trust set up under the New York Banking Law.
24. Since bankruptcy proceedings are considered actions in rem, it had been generally
held that personal notice might not be necessary. See Hanover Nat1 Bank v. Moyses,
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not previously decided whether the due process requirements of
reasonable notice must be met for dbbtors and other holders of
assets after the filing of a voluntary petition. However, in Rosenthal
v. Guaranty Bank & Trust Co.,2 a federal district court relieved an
innocent bank of liability to the trustee for the post-adjudication pay-
ment of a bankrupt depositor's check, relying upon a policy favoring
negotiability and upon the lack of actual knowledge of the proceedings
on the part of the bank.
In the instant case, the Court initially noted that the trustee was
subject to the same claims and defenses which could be asserted
against the bankrupt. The Court further noted that the duty to pay
the checks, which arose from the contract between the bank and the
depositor, constituted a valid defense against the trustee unless the
bank had received notice of the bankruptcy proceedings prior to
the payment. Relying on Mullane, the Court held that the filing of
a voluntary petition was insufficient notice to the bank,26 and that
thus the contract between the bank and the drawer remained in
effect. In answering the trustee's contention that the transfer of
the funds was invalid under section 70(d) (5) of the Bankruptcy
Act, the Court applied the "overriding consideration" of equitable
principles governing the exercise of bankruptcy jurisdiction to hold
that it would be inequitable to impose liability on the bank. The
Court did not hold that the bank's payment of the checks was proper
under section 70(d) (5) but rather that equity demanded that the
trustee recover from the party who benefited from the transaction,
i.e., the payee of the check. In a dissenting opinion, Mr. Justice
Harlan, although noting the obvious inequities to the bank, urged
that the plain terms of the statute rendered the bank liable. He
contended that any protection afforded by section 70 (d) was intended
for cases involving involuntary, not voluntary petitions, since one
of the main purposes of the section was to encourage business dealings
with a solvent debtor against whom an unwarranted petition may
have been filed.27
186 U.S. 181, 192 (1902) where the Court stated that creditors are entitled to rea-
sonable notice, and held publication to be reasonable in that case.
25. 139 F. Supp. 730 (W.D. La. 1956). The checks were cashed after the approval
of a petition for reorganization under Chapter 10 of the Bankruptcy Act. 11 U.S.C. §§
501-676 (1964). Approval, which is also an automatic adjudication of bankruptcy,
occurred the same day the petition was filed. The court's decision is criticized in 70
HAnv. L. Riv, 548 (1957).
26. The bank obviously has a substantial interest in the proceedings. Without notice
it may have to pay the check twice-once to the payee and once to the trustee.
27. He stated that if Congress had intended to protect those who transferred
property after the filing of a voluntary petition, the statute would have so provided.
Mr. Justice Harlan concluded that the Court, in not holding the bank liable, was
simply "measuring the statute by . . . its own conscience" and diluting the effects of
the 1938 amendments to the Bankruptcy Act. 385 U.S. at 110. Mr. Justice Fortas
1967 ] 1155RECENT CASES
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While the instant Court relied partly on equitable considerations
in holding the bank not liable, the impact of the decision on future
bankruptcy cases will undoubtedly come from its application of the
constitutional doctrine of Mullane. There appears to be little doubt
that the transfer by the bank was invalid within the literal meaning
of section 70(d) (5) of the Bankruptcy Act. Moreover, to relieve
the bank of liability would seem contrary to a basic policy of the act
of allowing the trustee to control all property after adjudication for
equitable distribution to creditors. However, there are other policy
considerations which properly prevailed in this situation. The risk of
double liability to the bank as a debtor of the bankrupt gives the
bank a substantive interest in the proceedings, which entitles it to
reasonable notice.28 To consider the automatic adjudication notice
to the world and thus hold the bank liable would seem contrary to
other provisions of the Act which have tended to limit the effect of
this legal fiction.2 9 The Mullane case was concerned with preventing
the use of patent legal fictions to deprive a person of substantial
property interest without notice and opportunity to be heard. The
application of its doctrine to the instant case is appropriate. The
Court's decision has thus substantially increased the duties of the
trustee with regard to notifying interested parties of the adjudica-
tion of bankruptcy. This will be particularly helpful to banks, whose
rapid transactions in commercial paper warrant some type of notice
before liability can be imposed, and the application of Mullane to
this situation will undoubtedly make the officers of the bankruptcy
court more conscious of notice requirements in all steps of the
bankruptcy proceedings.
dissented on the point of mootness raised in the oral argument. The payee of the
checks paid the joint judgment and only the bank appealed. The majority held that
because the payee had flled a demand for contribution from the bank, the question
was not moot, as the bank was still subject to suit as a result of the original judgment.
Mr. Justice Fortas argued that because the trustee bad already been paid, he lacked
a substantial stake in the outcome of the litigation, and that the appeal therefore
did not present an adversary proceeding.
28. With regard to the invalidity of the transfer, the question should be who, as
between the trustee and the payee of the check, should be entitled to the funds
which were on deposit in the bank. As stated by the majority, the payee is a
creditor of the bankrupt, and allowing the trustee to recover from him does not
deprive him of the right to participate in the distribution of the bankrupts assets.
29. 52 VA. L. Rlv., supra note 5, at 536 n.29. The provision with regard to the
transferability of real property after adjudication before such fact is recorded is in
keeping with the protection afforded bona fide purchasers by the recording acts, and
is contrary to the idea of constructive notice. 11 U.S.C. § 44(g) (1964). Furthermore,
personal property can be transferred between filing and adjudication by those acting
in good faith and for "present fair equivalent value." Also, a debtor of the bankrupt
can discharge a debt in good faith prior to adjudication. 11 U.S.C. § 110(d) (1964).
While all of these provisions are concerned with transfers before adjudication in the
case of an involuntary petition, the policy underlying them appears to be applicable
to a transfer after adjudication and before reasonable notice when filing and adjudica-
tion occur simultaneously.
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Constitutional Law-States Must Apply Federal
Harmless-Error Standard to Federal
Constitutional Error
During the California state court proceeding in which defendants
were tried and convicted, the prosecutor commented upon the de-
fendants' failure to testify and the trial judge charged the jury that
defendants' silence could be used as the basis for adverse inferences.'
On appea 2 the California Supreme Court held that, although these
comments at trial had denied defendants their constitutional rights,
such error did not constitute a "miscarriage of justice" and was
therefore harmless and not cause for reversal.3 On certiorari4 to the
United States Supreme Court, held, reversed. Whether a conviction
for crime should be sustained when a state has failed to accord fed-
eral constitutional rights is a federal question, and before such error
can be held harmless, the beneficiary of the error must prove beyond
a reasonable doubt that it did not contribute to the verdict obtained.
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
It is firmly established5 that the Supreme Court has appellate juris-
diction to review state court decisions only when the state court
has decided a federal question which is necessary to the judgment
rendered. If an independent and adequate state ground is dispositive
of the judgment, the Court has no power to review further. Never-
theless, a recent case, Henry v. Mississippi,6 illustrates the importance
of distinguishing between state substantive and procedural grounds
of decision. There the Mississippi Supreme Court held that petitioner
had waived his right to assert a claim of violation of his federal
1. The charge instructed the jury that in those matters within the knowledge of the
defendant on which he is silent the inferences unfavorable to a defendant are the more
probable. People v. Teale, 63 Cal. 2d 178, 196, 404 P.2d 209, 220, 45 Cal. Rptr. 729,
740 (1965).
2. Subsequent to the instant trial but before defendants' appeal to the California
Supreme Court, the United States Supreme Court, in a separate case, held this state
provision (CAL. CONST. art. I, § 13, which allowed comment upon an accused's failure
to testify) to be unconstitutional on the ground that it violated a person's fifth
amendment right against self-incrimination. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
3. "No judgment shall be set aside, or new trial granted, in any case . . . unless,
after an examination of the entire cause, including the evidence, the court shall be of
the opinion that the error complained of has resulted in a miscarriage of justice." CAL.
CoNsr. art. VI § 4 .
4. The Court granted certiorari limited to these questions: "Where there is a
violation of the rule of Griffin v. California . . . (1) can the error be held to be
harmless and (2) if so, was the error harmless in this case?" Chapman v. California,
383 U.S. 956, 956-57 (1966).
5. See 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1967) (sets forth the criteria under which the Supreme
Court has appellate review of state court decisions); Murdock v. City of Memphis,
87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1874) (Act of 1867 does not enlarge Court's federal question
jurisdiction as set forth in Judiciary Act of 1789).
6. 379 U.S. 443 (1965).
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constitutional rights by failing to adhere to the local trial procedure
of objecting contemporaneously to the introduction of illegal evidence.
On certiorari, the Supreme Court cited Murdock and recognized that
it had no power to revise judgments based on questions of state
substantive law which are constitutionally valid. The Court reasoned
that in such cases the state ground of disposition is to be deemed
"adequate" and any federal question present in the record becomes
moot, since a resolution of the federal question would not be neces-
sary to the decision. A decision by the Court on the federal question
would be, in effect, an advisory opinion, which the Court lacks juris-
diction to render. However, if a state procedural rule should bar im-
plementation of a federal right, then "the question of when and how
defaults in compliance with state procedural rules can preclude . . .
consideration of a federal question is itself a federal question."7 After
finding this federal question jurisdiction the Court then determines
whether enforcement of the local procedural rule serves a legitimate
state interest, and if it does not the rule is deemed an "inadequate"
state ground and cannot bar review. Exhibiting restraint in applying
the "adequacy" test to state procedure, the Court in Spencer v. Texas3
determined that the admission into evidence of a defendant's prior
convictions was a legitimate means of enforcing a state habitual of-
fender statute.9 Moreover, the Court held that the possibility of some
prejudice to the accused did not render the procedure unconstitu-
tional.10 Harmless-error statutes," which enable a court to sustain a
7. Id. at 447; see Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 125-26 (1945). See generally
R. ROBE1TsON & F. InuavAr,, Ju["SDICTON OF = SUIREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES 89, 163 (2d ed. R. Wolfson & P. Kurland 1951); Federal Judicial Power-A
Study of Limitations, 2 RACE EL. L. REP. 1215, 1222-28 (1957) (discusses doctrine
of equitable abstention).
8. 385 U.S. 554 (1967).
9. The majority argued that neither precedent nor specific provisions of the Con-
stitution establish the Court as a "rule-making organ for the promulgation of state
rules of criminal procedure." Id. at 564. Four dissenting justices found no legitimate
state interest to balance against the possible prejudicing of the accused. They countered
with the view that the criteria for decision in procedural due process cases need not
be drawn from a specific constitutional provision. Rather, they can be drawn from
the "traditional jurisprudential attitudes of our legal system." Id. at 570. The majority
cited Mr. Justice Cardozo to support its conclusion: a state rule of law "does not run
foul of the Fourteenth Amendment because another method may seem to our thinking
to be fairer or wiser or to give a surer promise of protection to the prisoner at bar."
Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934).
10. The Court has consistently followed a policy of ensuring, when possible, adequate
opportunity for federal judicial review of constitutional rights. In Fay v. Noia, 372
U.S. 391 (1963), the Court held that the adequate state ground rule does not apply
to federal habeas corpus jurisdiction, since the rule is a function of the limitations on
appellate review. Thus, a federal court has the power to grant habeas corpus relief to
a petitioner whose federal claims are barred from review in the Supreme Court "be-
cause of a procedural default furnishing an adequate and independent ground of
state decision." Id. at 434.
11. These statutes represent legislative and judicial reaction to the stringent rule
1158 [ VoL. 20
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judgment in the face of admitted trial error, have long been in wide-
spread use in state 2 and federal' 3 courts. The majority of these
statutes contain broad standards of harmlessness, which emphasize
a "miscarriage of justice" and "the substantial rights of the parties."'4
Generally these statutes also place the burden of proof of "harmful-
ness" on the excepting party, requiring him to show how the error
has prejudicially affected the result of his case.'5 In Fahy v. Con-
neCtICUtI6 the Supreme Court reversed a state court decision which
had held that the admission of unconstitutionally-obtained evidence
was harmless error.17 Applying its own standard of harmlessness, the
Court held that the admission of the evidence was prejudicial and
harmful since there was a "reasonable possibility that the evidence
complained of might have contributed to the conviction." 18 The Court
refused, however, to go beyond the facts of the case and establish a
federal standard of harmlessness for state courts to use when review-
ing denials of federal constitutional guarantees. 19
In the instant case, the Court reasoned that the issue of whether
a state conviction should be sustained in the face of an admitted
failure to accord federal constitutional rights was a federal question.
Noting the usefulness of harmless-error statutes, the Court concluded
that there might indeed be harmless constitutional error in the setting
of a particular case, and thus refused to sustain petitioners' conten-
tion that all federal constitutional errors are grounds for automatic
reversal.20 The Court then proceeded to define the standard to be
at early common law that technical errors alone required automatic reversal of a
conviction. "The general object [of the statutes] was simple: To substitute judgment
for automatic application of rules .. " Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 759-60
(1946).
12. See 1 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 21 (3d ed. 1940).
13. 28 U.S.C. § 2111 (1964) provides: "On the hearing of any appeal or writ of
certiorari in any case, the court shall give judgment . . . without regard to errors or
defects which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties." FED. R. CnLr. P.
52(a) provides: "Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect
substantial rights should be disregarded." See also FED. R. Civ. P. 61.
14. See 1 J. Wiemoymn supra note 12.
15. Id. at 373 n.12.
16. 375 U.S. 85 (1963).
17. The state court had utilized a state statutory harmless-error provision and had
found that the error had not materially injured the appellant. Fahy v. Connecticut,
149 Conn. 577, 183 A.2d 256 (1962).
18. 375 U.S. 85, 86-87 (1963).
19. Four justices, dissenting, argued that the only question which merited the
Court's consideration was whether the fourteenth amendment prevented a state from
applying its own harmless-error rule in such a situation.
20. The Court recognized that certain of its own decisions had indicated that some
constitutional rights are so fundamental to a fair trial that they could never qualify
as harmless. 386 U.S. at 23; see Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right
to counsel); Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958) (coerced confession); Tumey
v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927) (impartial judge).
1967 ] 1159
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applied by the states21 in determining the "harmlessness" of federal
constitutional error and held that the beneficiary of the error must
"prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did
not contribute to the verdict obtained."2 In conclusion, the Court
held that because of the prosecutor's repeated references to petitioners'
failure to testify the state could not possibly meet its burden of proof
under the standard, and accordingly reversed the convictions.' Mr.
Justice Stewart, concurring, contended that the Court had consistently
rejected the notion that a harmless-error rule could be applied to con-
stitutional violations. However, he stated that although judicial econ-
omy may conceivably require such a rule to be utilized in cases involv-
ing appropriate violations, the rule certainly should not be applied in-
discriminately to all constitutional violations. But, he concluded that
automatic reversal was appropriate in the instant case, since the Court
is not equipped to assume the burdensome task of reviewing individ-
ual cases which contain such unconstitutional comment to determine
whether it contributed to the verdict obtained. In the dissent Mr.
Justice Harlan argued that the federal question should be the consti-
tutionality of the state harmless-error rule itself. He concluded that
a state rule, if constitutional, would constitute an independent and
adequate state ground of judgment and therefore bar further federal
review.24 Individual case applications of constitutional state rules
would still be subject to review by the Court on an ad hoc basis to
determine "adequacy."
The instant Court has established a standard of harmless error for
state courts to apply to all violations of federal constitutional guaran-
tees. However, the question might well be asked whether such a
standard is necessary. Certainly nothing in the nature of the federal
system would justify a presumption that the states will use their ju-
dicial offices in derogation of federal rights. Yet the Court has as-
s.umed the burden of supervising the state disposition of such rights.
The Court reasons that it "cannot leave to the States the formulation
of the authoritative laws, rules, and remedies designed to protect peo-
ple from infractions by the States of federally guaranteed rights."25
However, it is questionable whether precedent or statutes defining the
21. State courts are still free to utilize state harmless-error rules where the error
concerns only application of state procedure or state law. 386 U.S. at 21.
22. 386 U.S. at 24.
23. "Such a machine-gun repetition of a denial of constitutional rights, all designed
and calculated to make petitioners' version of the evidence worthless, can no more
be considered harmless than the introduction against a defendant of a coerced con-
fession." 386 U.S. at 26. The Court appended to the opinion the petitioners' compilation
of the prosecutor's comments.
24. "The Court has no power, however, to declare which of many admittedly con-
stitutional alternatives a State may choose." 386 U.S. at 48.
25. 386 U.S. at 21.
1160 [ VOL. 20
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Court's power of appellate review can justify the Court's adoption of
a harmless-error rule to be applied to all violations of federal consti-
tutional guarantees. The instant Court, contrary to its approach in
Henry, did not first seek an adequate state ground of decision by
utilizing the basic distinction between state procedural and substan-
tive grounds. As the dissent implied, the distinction should have been
made, since in this distinction lies the jurisdictional basis for Supreme
Court review of state court adjudications of federal constitutional
issues. Had it made the distinction before applying its own standard
of "harmlessness," the Court could have legitimately disposed of the
California rule by declaring it either unconstitutional or, if consti-
tutional, "inadequate" as a non-federal ground of decision. But hav-
ing sidestepped the distinction, the Court merely concluded that the
state's application of a local harmless-error rule to a federal consti-
tutional error was itself a federal question which demanded formula-
tion and future application of a national standard. The dissent's reason-
ing would seem to be the better approach. Since there was no
evidence here that California, or any other state, had defeated or
diluted the application of federal constitutional guarantees through
the use of local harmless-error rules, it would seem to have been un-
necessary for the Court to fashion a new standard to impose on all
state proceedings. Had the Court allowed the state courts to con-
tinue applying local standards to federal constitutional rights, it would
still have retained the power to determine the constitutionality of a
state rule and then assess its "adequacy" as an independent state
ground of decision. However, now that the states must apply the
federal standard in such situations, the Court has insured further
uniformity in the adjudication of federally-guaranteed rights.
Juvenile Courts-Juveniles in Delinquency
Proceedings Accorded Same Rights as Adults
in Criminal Trials
Petitioner Gault, a minor of fifteen, was placed in the custody of a
detention home1 after being apprehended for allegedly having made
a lewd telephone call. Gault's parents were not given formal notice
of their son's apprehension or of the informal delinquency hearing
1. At the time of his apprehension, Gault was on probation following a prior
juvenile court proceeding. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
1967 ]
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which was to be held the following day.2 During this hearing3 peti-
tioner made an inculpatory statement. At neither this hearing nor the
formal hearing held a few days later were the complainant or defense
counsel present.4 At the conclusion of the formal hearing, Gault
was adjudged "delinquent" and committed to the State Industrial
School for the remainder of his minority.5 Since the state provided no
appeal from a juvenile court proceeding, Gault petitioned for a writ
of habeas corpus, claiming that sections 8-201 through 8-239 of the
Arizona Juvenile Code were unconstitutional because they allowed
the use of unswom testimony, failed to provide for proper notice of
the hearing and charges to the child and parents, and did not accord
the child the rights to counsel, confrontation, and silence.6 The lower
court dismissed the petition, and the Arizona Supreme Court affirmed
on the ground that a lesser standard of due process was demanded
for delinquency proceedings than for adult criminal trials.7 On appeal
to the United States Supreme Court, held, reversed. The due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment requires that notice of hearing
and charges, the right of confrontation, the right to counsel and the
privilege against self-incrimination be provided in juvenile court
proceedings in which a juvenile is threatened with a deprivation of
his liberty resulting from a determination of delinquency. In 'e
Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
Delinquency8 proceedings are considered civil rather than criminal
2. The Gaults learned of their son's arrest through neighbors. In addition, they
received only informal notice of the two hearings. Id.
3. The detention officer filed a petition with the juvenile court on the date of this
hearing which the Gaults never saw, and which gave no grounds for detention other
than that the petitioner was a juvenile in need of custody as a delinquent. Id. at 5.
4. Although Mrs. Gault requested that the complainant come forward, the judge
stated that this was unnecessary. Id. at 7.
5. Under Ariz. REv. STAT. § 8-201 (6) (a), (b) a "delinquent child" is one "who
has violated a law of the state or an ordinance or regulation of a political subdivision
thereof"' or who is "incorrigible." Petitioner's delinquent conduct consisted of a
violation of Apuz. REV. STAT. § 13-377 which provides that a person who "in the
presence or hearing of any woman or child ... uses vulgar, abusive or obscene language,
is guilty of a misdemeanor." The adult penalty for this offense is a fine of $5 to $50
or not more than two months imprisonment in the county jail; had Gault been 18, he
would have been subject to the adult penalty.
6. Gault also challenged the statutes failure to require a written record of the
hearing and to provide for appellate review, but the Supreme Court did not rule on
these issues.
7. Inre Gault, 99 Ariz. 181, 407 P.2d 760 (1965).
8. The definitional aspect of the word "delinquent" under statutes similar to
Arizona's has led to divergent interpretations. For example, in State v. Breon, 244
Iowa 49, 55 N.W.2d 565 (1952), the Iowa Supreme Court held that a youth %vho
had attempted a rape was not delinquent, for to be so classified, one must habitually
violate the law. On the other hand, in New York, a minor arrested for driving without
a license was adjudged delinquent for breaking a state law. In re Jacobsen, 283 App.
Div. 719, 127 N.Y.S.2d 356 (1954).
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in nature. In such cases, the state acts as parens patriae,9 not to de-
termine the guilt or innocence of the juvenile,'0 but rather "what had
best be done in his interest and in the interest of the state to save
him from a downward career."" This philosophy has created an in-
formal courtroom atmosphere in which the restrictive elements of a
criminal trial are not present. The denial of the procedural rights
accorded to adults has been defended on several grounds. First, a
juvenile is not accused of a specific crime and is not placed on trial;
therefore, the rights of an accused simply do not arise.'2 Secondly,
since protection from the stigma of a criminal trial is sought,13 a
flexible system in which the judge can act to correct the child's
condition is considered preferable to an adversary system which
would result not only in punishment, but also in publication of the
child's conduct. Finally, some authorities feel that formal proceedings
which induce fear in the youth, are unsuitable for reform.' 4 Strict
adherence to the parens patriae doctrine, however, places the juvenile
in a procedural limbo; if the court determines that he is "delinquent,"
he is subject to a confinement often comparable to or greater than the
criminal penalties to which adults are subjected; 5 yet he is denied the
defenses available to an adult. Realizing this gap between theory and
practice, several courts in recent years have attempted to bring the
juvenile and criminal systems closer together through the application
of certain constitutional safeguards to delinquency proceedings. 16 In
Haley v. Ohio,17 the United States Supreme Court held that merely
9. The classic case setting forth the parens patriae philosophy -is Cinque v. Boyd,
99 Conn. 70, 121 A. 678 (1923).
10. The contrast between the parens patriae philosophy and the reality of juvenile
court procedure is shown in Harris v. Souder, 233 Ind. 287, 289, 119 N.E.2d 9, 10
(1954) where a juvenile was found "guilty as charged" of "contributing to the
delinquency of a minor," but the Indiana Supreme Court found no such juvenile offense.
11. Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 Hxnv. L. REv. 104, 119-20 (1909).
12. E.g., United States ex rel. Yonick v. Briggs, 266 F. 434 (W.D. Pa. 1920);
In re Hans, 174 Neb. 612, 119 N.W.2d 72 (1963) (denial of trial by jury); In re
Holmes, 379 Pa. 599, 109 A.2d 523, cert. denied, 348 U.S. 973 (1954) (denial of
privilege against self-incrimination); State v. Christensen, 119 Utah 361, 227 P.2d 760
(1951) (no error to use unswom testimony).
13. Those jurisdictions holding, that proceedings in a juvenile court are not criminal
prosecutions are listed in Pee v. United States, 274 F.2d 556, 561-62 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
14. Note, Juvenile Delinquents: The Police, State Courts, and Individualized Justice,
79 HAnv. L. REv. 775, 791 (1966).
15. See note 5 supra.
16. E.g., Trimble v. Stone, 187 F. Supp. 483 (D.D.C. 1960) (right to bail); In re
Poff, 135 F. Supp. 224 (D.D.C. 1955) (right to counsel); In re Gregory W. and
Gerald S., 19 N.Y.2d 55, 224 N.E.2d 102, 277 N.Y.S.2d 675 (1966) (privilege against
self-incrimination); In re Mantell, 157 Neb. 900, 62 N.W.2d 308 (1954) (right of
confrontation); Hampton v. State, 167 Ala. 73, 52 So. 659 (1910) (privilege against
self-incrimination); Garza v. State, 172 Tex. Crim. 468, 369 S.W.2d 36 (1963) (free-
dom from double jeopardy).
17. 332 U.S. 596 (1948); accord, Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49 (1962).
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informing a juvenile of his right to silence was not sufficient to meet
the requirements of due process; he must also be fully apprised of
his right to counsel. The Court reasoned that ,the age and inexperience
of youths confronting police interrogators militated against their com-
prehension and exercise of the right to silence. One court has de-
manded that when juveniles are being interrogated, a stenographer
be present at all times so that the "voluntariness" of their confessions
be, if not assured, at least readily ascertainable on review.'8 Another
court provided that the minor be charged with a specific act, not
merely "delinquency" and that the truth of the charge be determined
in an adversary proceeding. 19 The right to counsel at delinquency
proceedings"0 and at preliminary hearings to decide whether jurisdic-
tion will be waived by the juvenile court in favor of criminal court2'
has been extended. In a recent decision, Kent v. United States,2 the
Supreme Court interpreted the District of Columbia juvenile Code
to entitle a juvenile to a hearing on the question of waiver, access to
any probation office files on the youth,2 and a statement of reasons
for the court's disposition of the case. Although the Kent decision
was largely limited to its facts, the Court questioned "the justifiability
of affording a juvenile less protection than is accorded to adults ...
particularly where ... there is an absence of any indication that the
denial of rights available to adults was offset, mitigated or explained
by the action of the [g]overnment, as parens patriae."2
In the instant case the Court stated that written notice of the
specific charges or factual allegations to be considered at the hearing
must be given at the earliest possible time to the minor and his
parents. Failure to give notice in an effort to shield the child from
public knowledge of his conduct was denounced as a violation of
due process. As in many juvenile cases, the initial hearing was on
the merits and the child's freedom was at stake; notice was demanded
so that his freedom could be defended. The Court found it necessary
for the child and his parents to be informed of the right to counsel
and, in the case of indigents, the right to appointed counsel. The
Court noted that in Arizona the probation officer is the arresting
officer who testifies against the youth, and therefore, in no sense
18. In re State ex rel. Carlo, 48 N.J. 224, 225 A.2d 110 (1966).
19. In re Coyle, 122 Ind. App. 217, 101 N.E.2d 192 (1951).
20. Shioutakon v. District of Columbia, 236 F.2d 666 ,(D.C. Cir. 1956).
21. Black v. United States, 355 F.2d 104 (D.C. Cir. 1965). A decision to waive
jurisdiction is a determination that the youth in question will not benefit from the
parens patriae system.
22. 383 U.S. 541 (1966), noted in 19 VAND. L. Bnv. 1385 (1966).
23. Such files are used by the judge at the hearing in considering the extent of
corrective action necessary, e.g., whether to place the child on probation or to commit
him to an institution.
24. 383 U.S. at 551.
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acts as his "defender" or fulfills the role of attorney in guiding the
youth. Reasoning that it would be inequitable if hardened criminals
could avail themselves of the privilege against self-incrimination but
children could not, the'Court held that the privilege is an essential
requirement of due process in dealing with juveniles. Furthermore,
the Court stated that the civil nature of the proceedings did not
interfere with exercise of the privilege which may be claimed in any
proceeding. The Court also refused to allow commitment of a
juvenile as the result of a proceeding in which unsworn testimony
was used and the right to confront witnesses was unavailable unless
a valid confession 5 had been obtained. In stating these procedural
rights, the Court looked to the failure of the parens patriae system
in preventing recidivism,26 the unreliability of confessions made by
juveniles without the aid of counsel, and the general inability of
the adolescent to comprehend his rights and the consequences of
his actions when confronted by the state in its role as parent. The
Court concluded that if a child is to suffer deprivation of his liberty
as a consequence of a court's analysis of his conduct, he must be
provided with procedural tools with which to defend himself.
Struck by the paradox of a system which protects the rights of
adults but not of children, the Court has attempted to preserve the
flexibility of the juvenile court system while laying down certain
safeguards which must be provided in delinquency proceedings in
order to satisfy the requirements of due process. Many will no
doubt view this decision as inevitable in light of the last decade of
decisions extending the same rights to adults.28  In this sense the
instant decision is merely a downward chronological extension of
established rights. However, the introduction of the adversary system
into the framework of the juvenile court poses the question of whether
the parens patriae framework will be engulfed by this new element.
25. A valid confession would generally require the presence and assistance of counsel.
If, for a permissible reason, counsel is not present, a valid confession would be one
which has not been coerced, nor one which is the product of fright, despair, or
"adolescent fantasy." 387 U.S. at 55.
26. The Court relied extensively on S. WHEELER & L. CorraLL, JUVENILE DELIN-
QUENCY-ITS PREVENTION AND CONTROL (1965) to indicate the distrust felt by juveniles
who bad been urged to confess and then punished by the state-parent. This often
resulted in subsequent difficulties in rehabilitation.
27. In addition to the use made by the Court of the REPORT OF THE PasmENT's
CoznussioN o,\ LAw ENFORCEMENT AND TlE ADmINISTRATION OF JUSTICE (1967) in
its general assessment of the juvenile court system, the Court noted the Report's demand
that counsel be appointed in all juvenile cases "without requiring any affirmative choice
by child or parent." at 86-87.
28. E.g., Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196 (1948) (right to notice); Gideon v. Wain-
wright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (indigent's right to counsel); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S.
1 (1964) (privilege against self-incrimination); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966) (right to counsel and to remain silent at critical stages of proceedings).
1967] 1165
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
Criticism of the decision will come from those who fear that the
beneficial aspects of the parens patriae philosophy will be lost and
the child once again placed in the position he held at the turn of the
century29-subject to the more brutal aspects of adult proceedings
and punishment.30 However, this criticism does not take into account
the tremendous changes in adult criminal procedure which have taken
place since the first separation of juvenile from adult proceedings.
Nor does it consider that a determination of delinquency is often the
same as conviction for a crime, under a more euphemistic name.31
Finally, this criticism fails to realize that the instant decision was made
with the interests of the child in mind. The Gault case shows an
awareness of the gulf between the philosophy and the reality oc-
casioned by the efforts of the state to provide for its children, 32 As
stated in dicta in Kent: "[t]he admonition to function in a 'parentar
relationship is not an invitation to procedural arbitrariness."a Just as
a child is protected from an abusive parent by the law, the Court
has placed restrictions on the treatment a child may receive at the
hands of his "state-parent." Confronted with this demand to provide
juveniles adult procedural safeguards if they are to be punished by
confinement as adults, the state legislatures should take this opportu-
nity to re-evaluate the effectiveness of their systems in providing the
more desirable aspects of the parens patriae doctrine.
29. Illinois was the first to establish a separate system for dealing with juveniles
in 1899.
30. 387 U.S. at 78 (dissenting opinion).
31. Paulsen, Fairness to the Juvenile Offender, 41 MINN. L. Rav. 547, 550-51
(1957).
32. For an analysis of all aspects of juvenile courts, including arguments to limit
further their jurisdiction, see Lemert, Juvenile Justice-Quest and Reality, 4 TIANSAC-
oroN 30 (1967).
33. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. at 555.
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Taxation-Federal Income Taxation-Section 267 of
the IRC Applies to Involuntary Sale
In 1960 the Internal Revenue Service seized petitioner's shares in
a closely-held family corporation for the purpose of satisfying a fed-
eral tax liability.' The IRS sold the stock at public auction to petiti-
oner's wife, the only bidder, for $25,000. Petitioner's basis for the
stock had been $135,000. In their joint income tax return for 1960
petitioner and his wife claimed a capital loss on the sale, and in their
returns for 1961 and 1962 claimed capital loss carryovers based on
the sale.2 The Commissioner disallowed the carryovers3 on the ground
that a deduction for the loss on the 1960 sale of stock was an exchange
between related parties and prohibited by section 2674 of the Internal
Revenue Code. On petition to the Tax Court, held, affirmed. Deduc-
tion by a stockholder of a loss arising from an involuntary sale of
corporate stock to a member of his family is prohibited by section
267(a) (1) of the IRC. James H. Merritt, Sr., 47 T.C. 519 (1967).
Prior to 1934 taxpayers were free to create tax losses by sales or
exchanges between related parties and then to take a tax deduction
for the "loss" sustained. In an attempt to limit this previously un-
qualified right, Congress enacted section 24(a) (6) of the Revenue
Act of 19345 (hereinafter referred to as section 267) which provided
that "no deduction shall be allowed ... in respect of losses from sales
or exchanges of property between .. .members of a family ....,,
The scope of this provision was delineated in McWilliams v. Commis-
sioner7 where the Supreme Court held that deduction for losses arising
1. Action was taken pursuant to INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 6331, 6335, 6338, and
6339, to collect taxes owing by petitioner for the years 1944-46. The total indebtedness
was $191,812.98 plus interest.
2. See INT. REv: CODE OF 1954, § 1212, pertaining to capital loss carryovers.
3. Although the court does not discuss the matter, the deduction taken in 1960
was obviously not challenged because of the 3 year statute of limitations. Thus, only
the 1961 and 1962 carryovers could be reached.
4. TNT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 267, formerly INT. REV. CODE OF 1939, § 24. The
pertinent parts of this section are as follows:
"(a) Deduction Disallowed.-No deduction shall be allowed-(1) Losses.-In re-
spect of losses from sales or exchanges of property . . . directly or indirectly, between
persons specified within any one of the paragraphs of subsection (b).
"(b) Relationships-The persons referred to in section (a) are: (1) Members of a
family . . . ; (2) An individual and a corporation more than 50 percent in value of
the outstanding stock of which is owned, directly or indirectly, by or for such
individual ... "
5. 48 Stat. 691 (1934).
6. Id.
7. 331 U.S. 694 (1947). In order to establish tax losses, a husband who managed
the separate estate of his wife, as well as his own, ordered his broker to sell certain
stock for the account of one of the two and to buy the same number of shares of
the same stock for the other, at as nearly the same price as possible. The exchange
was made on the open market and the buying spouse received stock certificates dif-
ferent from those the other had sold. The Court held that deductions in their
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from the sale of stock on the open market followed by a purchase on
the open market of the same number of like shares by a related party
was prohibited by section 267. In denying the deduction, the Court
declared "that the purpose of section 267 was to put an end to the
right of taxpayers to choose .. . their own time for realizing tax
losses on investments which, for most practical purposes, are con-
tinued uninterrupted."8 The McWilliams decision, however, involved
only a voluntary sale of stock,9 and a conflict has since developed as
to whether section 267 should also apply to involuntary sales. In
Helvering v. Hammell10 the Supreme Court, considering the character
of a loss sustained from the involuntary sale of a capital asset, held
that no distinction was intended between losses from involuntary
sales and losses from voluntary sales of capital assets. The Court
found no basis for such a distinction either in the language of the
Revenue Act of 1934 itself or in its purpose and legislative history.1'
Applying this approach to sales of ordinary property, the Tax Court
in Zacek v. Commissioner2 held that both voluntary and involuntary
sales of property to members of the taxpayer's family were con-
templated by section 267 (a) (1). 13 The court stated that since the
sale of the property was between members of a family it must be dis-
allowed under the broad language of the statute, regardless of the
resulting hardship. Two courts of appeal, however, have rejected this
interpretation. 14 In McCarty v. Cripe,15 the Seventh Circuit de-
termined that the purpose of section 267 was to put an end to the
right of taxpayers to choose their own time for realizing losses, and
that the section therefore does not apply to an involuntary sale or
separate income tax returns for losses on such sales were forbidden by § 267 as
losses from "sales or exchanges of property directly or indirectly . . . between mem-
bers of a family."
8. Id. at 700.
9. See Commissioner v. Ickelheimer, 132 F.2d 660 (2d Cir. 1943), where the court
in a much criticized opinion held that § 267 would not apply when the sale takes
place on the open market. 55 HIAv. L. R-v. 872 (1942). But see Commissioner v.
Kohn, 158 F.2d 32 (4th Cir. 1946), which held that when there is a clear purpose
to avoid taxes and to control the realization of a loss, § 267 will apply even if the
sale takes place on the open market through a broker or some other third party.
10. 311 U.S. 504 (1941). The taxpayer sustained a loss upon the foreclosure sale
of his interest in real estate which he acquired for profit.
11. Id. at 510. The Court also pointed to the canon of statutory construction that
courts are not free to reject the literal or usual meaning of the words of a statute
unless an absurd result would be reached.
12. 8 T.C. 1056 (1947). The transaction involved an involuntary foreclosure sale
of mortgaged property to members of the mortgagor's family. '
13. Cf. Norton v. United States, 144 F. Supp. 425 (W.D. La. 1956). Sales of
stock by the taxpayer and subsequent purchase of the same shares for his mother
were made at the direction of their mutual agent. The losses sustained by the tax-
payer were disallowed under § 267.
14. The court placed particular emphasis on the words of the statute, "in any case."
8 T.C. at 1057.
15. 201 F.2d 679, 682 (7th Cir. 1953). The taxpayer's farm was sold for taxes and
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transfer over which the taxpayer has no control. The same principle
was endorsed by the Fourth Circuit in McNeill v. Commissioner.
16
The courts in both cases relied upon the McWilliams interpretation
of the purpose of section 267,17 and emphasized that the taxpayers
should not be allowed to "choose their own time for realizing tax
losses ...."18
In disallowing the deduction in the instant case the court interpreted
McWilliams as dictating an absolute prohibition of the allowance of
a deduction for a loss resulting from a sale between related parties.
The court pointed to the declaration in McWilliams that the purpose
of section 267 was to terminate the practice of taxpayers choosing
their own time for the realization of a tax loss on investments which,
in effect, were uninterrupted. Particular emphasis was placed on the
Supreme Court's statement hat this purpose was to be effectuated
"independent of the manner in which an intragroup transfer was
accomplished ... ."19 While recognizing that the timing of a trans-
action was necessary in the taking of any loss, the court determined
that this timing is of no consequence in the situation which Congress
intended to eliminate when it enacted section 267, that situation being
the deduction of a loss resulting from a sale directly or indirectly be-
tween members of a family. Thus the court concluded that the
operation of section 267 does not depend upon the good faith of
the parties involved or upon the voluntariness of the sale; the statute
simply requires that the loss result from a sale directl or indirectly
between related parties.20 Judge Dawson, in a dissenting opinion,
examined the legislative history of the statute, which he felt the
majority erroneously ignored. He determined that, since the statutory
purpose was to close a loophole which allowed taxpayers to avoid
taxes by choosing the time when their losses would be realized, sec-
tion 267 was not meant to apply to situations such as that found in
the instant case where the taxpayer had no power to determine the
time of the sale or transfer.
was purchased by a trustee with money furnished by the taxpayer. The trustee
shortly thereafter conveyed the farm to a corporation in which the taxpayer owned
more than 50% of the stock, and the taxpayer was credited by the corporation for
the amount of the loan.
16. 251 F.2d 863 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 825 (1958). The taxpayer,
a lawyer, entered into an unsuccessful real estate venture. The land was seized to
satisfy taxes. Both the government and the taxpayer tried unsuccessfully to sell the
land. Finally, after 6 years, the government offered to sell the land at a price con-
siderably lower than the basis of the taxpayer. The property was subsequently sold
to a corporation in which all the stock was held by the taxpayer and members of
his family.
17. See note 7 supra and accompanying text.
18. See note 7 supra and accompanying text.
19. 331 U.S. at 699.
20. The concurring opinion of Judge Raum supports the majority by citing legislative
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The divergence between the two views over the proper interpre-
tation to be given McWilliams is one of emphasis. Both sides cite
the same passage from McWilliams in support of their conclusions re-
garding the scope of section 267 but place emphasis on different
clauses. The McCarty-McNeill view places emphasis upon the fact
that taxpayers are allowed to "choose ... their own time for realizing
tax losses ... ."21 The other view, consistently advanced by the Tax
Court, emphasizes that section 267 was directed at a type of transac-
tion where the "investments ... for most practical purposes, are con-
tinued uninterrupted."22 Proponents of the first view cite several ex-
cerpts from the legislative history of the act in support of the argu-
ment that the statutory purpose is the "closing up of a loophole" which
the taxpayers had prior to the enactment of the Revenue Act of 1934.
The nature of this loophole, however, is never precisely explained.
Upon close examination of the history, it can be seen that the evil
sought to be remedied was not allowing taxpayers to choose their
own time for realizing a loss, 23 but was instead the allowance of a loss
deduction when the taxpayer retained control over the property and
in effect suffered no real economic loss. If related parties are viewed
as an economic unit, it can be seen that in fact no economic loss
occurs. 24 The statute [section 267] is clear and certain. It deals with"sales or exchanges of property . .. , directly or indirectly," between
related parties. An involuntary sale, by the designation of all pro-
ponents of the McCarty-McNeill view, is in fact a sale. There is no
ambiguity, and the courts should be slow to reject the literal or
history of the section which indicates that involuntary sales as well as voluntary
ones were meant to be encompassed by the act.
21. 331 U.S. at 700.
22. Id.
23. According to INT. REv. Cone oF 1954, § 165, the taxpayer is allowed to take
a deduction for any loss realized, even when the realization resulted from an exercise
of choice by the taxpayer, provided that the property is free and clear of its former
owner. "There shall be allowed as a deduction any loss sustained during the taxable
year and not compensated for by insurance or otherwise." (Emphasis added).
24. Aside from the disallowance of the loss deduction, § 267 does not change the
position of the economic unit to a great extent. Acording to § 267(d) if a taxpayer
acquires property by purchase or exchange from a transferor who sustained a loss on
the transaction not allowable as a deduction by reason of § 267(a)(1), then any gain
realized by the taxpayer on a sale or other disposition of the property is recognized
only to the extent that the gain exceeds the amount of such loss as is properly
allocable to the property sold or otherwise disposed of by the taxpayer. For example,
if petitioner's wife had disposed of the property previously owned by petitioner, her
basis in effect would have been his old basis of $135,000 rather than the cost of the
property to her ($25,000), and she would have been taxed only on that amount
which exceeded $135,000. However, it should be noted that § 267(d) applies only
to the nonrecognition of gain and does not technically affect basis. Thus, in the
above illustration if petitioner's wife bad disposed of the property for an amount less
than $25,000, a loss deduction could have been taken only on the remainder of $25,000
minus the sale price. Treas. Reg. § 1.267(d)-i (1958).
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usual meaning of the words of a statute.25 Furthermore, it is not im-
portant how the transaction takes place. So long as the taxpayer
taking the loss maintains an economic interest in the property after
the transaction is completed, no genuine loss is deemed to have
taken place, and a deduction is precluded by section 267.
Torts-Right of Privacy-Rule of New York Times
v. Sullivan Extended to Actions for Invasion
of Privacy
In February, 1955, the defendant publisher of Life Magazine pub-
lished an article entitled "True Crime Inspires Tense Play"' concerning
a play based on the novel The Desperate Hours, by Joseph Hayes.
The article sensationally portrayed the novel and the play as accurate
versions of plaintiffs' ordeal while held hostages of two escaped
convicts.2 The plaintiffs brought an action under the New York
right of privacy statute3 alleging that the novel and play contained
significant factual differences from their experience. The defendants
contended that the article dealt with legitimate news of value and
concern to the public and was published in good faith without malice.
The trial court entered judgment for the plaintiffs for $50,000 com-
pensatory and $25,000 punitive damages. The Supreme Court,
Appellate Division, ordered a new trial as to damages only, sustaining
the plaintiffs' verdict on the ground that the article was not dissemina-
tion of news,4 and the New York Court of Appeals affirmed.5 On
25. See Helvering v. Hammell, supra note 10.
1. LiFE, Feb. 28, 1955, at 75.
2. The article contained photographs of scenes from the play taken on location
at the Hills' former residence. The text of the article which identified the plaintiffs
by name was: "Three years ago Americans all over the country read about the
desperate ordeal of the James Hill family, who were held prisoners in their home
outside Philadelphia by three escaped convicts. Later, they read about it in Joseph
Hayes' novel, The Desperate Hours, inspired by the family's experience. Now they
can see the story re-enacted in Hayes' Broadway play based on the book, and next
year will see it in his movie ..."
3. N.Y. Civ. RIGHrs LAw §§ 50-51 (McKinney 1948). Section 50 is a penal pro-
vision, making violation of the statute a misdemeanor, but it was not applied in this
case. Section 51 provides: "Any person whose name, portrait or picture is used
within this state for advertising purposes or for the purposes of trade without the written
consent first obtained ... may ... sue and recover damages. . . ." The section further
provides for punitive damages in the event of a knowing violation by the defendant.
4. 18 App. Div. 2d 485, 240 N.Y.S.2d 286 (1st Dep't 1963).
5. 15 N.Y.2d 986, 207 N.E.2d 604, 260 N.Y.S.2d 7 (1965).
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appeal to the United States Supreme Court, held, reversed. Liability
for invasion of the right of privacy by a published article containing
false statements must be predicated on a showing of the publisher's
knowledge of the falsity of the statements or his reckless disregard
for the truth. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
Responding to the advocacy of Warren and Brandeis, New York was
the first state to recognize a right of privacy.6 The New York statute,
enacted in 1903, is limited in scope, permitting recovery only for
the unauthorized use of a person's name or picture for purposes of
advertising or trade usage.7 While "advertising" has presented few
problems to New York courts,8 determining when publicity by mass
media is a trade usage rather than a communication of news has
presented much greater difficulty. New York has refused to adopt
the view that presentations by communications media, operated for
profit, are always trade usages, 9 a conclusion which would place
the use of any person's name within the statute. The courts have
recognized as an exception to the statute a privilege to publish names
and pictures in connection with the dissemination of news, educational
and informational material which is within the public interest.10 The
courts have noted that a public figure," whether he be such by choice
or involuntarily, "is subject to the often searching beam of publicity
6. Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HAnv. L. REv. 193 (1890). Follow-
ing that article, several New York courts permitted recovery on the basis of such a
right. See, e.g., Marks v. Jaffa, 6 Misc. 290, 26 N.Y.S. 908 (Super. Ct. N.Y.C. 1893).
But this trend was halted in Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N.Y. 538,
64 N.E. 442 (1902) where the New York Court of Appeals rejected the existence of
the right of privacy, causing a storm of professional and popular disapproval which
led to the enactment of New York's right of privacy statute. See 15 HARv. L.
Bv. 227 (1901); 2 COLum. L. R-v. 486 (1902).
7. "The statute, while accepting and incorporating into the law the principle of
privacy, is not as broad in its embrace as the champions of privacy or pioneers in that
field would make it.... The statute was born of an advertising case and its application
is still confined to a commercial use or exploitation of a person's name or picture."
Sutton v. Hearst Corp., 277 App. Div. 155, 162, 98 N.Y.S.2d 233, 239 (1st Dep't
1950).
8. However, the meaning of advertising can present some difficulty. Compare
Booth v. Curtis Publishing Co., 11 N.Y.2d 907, 182 N.E.2d 812, 228 N.Y.S,2d 468
(1962) (mem.), with Myers v. U.S. Camera Publishing Corp., 9 Misc. 2d 765, 167
N.Y.S.2d 771 (N.Y. City Ct. 1957).
9. Silver, Privacy and the First Amendment, 34 FomnrDr L. REV. 553, 555 (1966).
10. See Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp., 34 F. Supp. 19 (S.D.N.Y. 1938), aff'd,
113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 711 (1940), holding the statute was
not violated by publication in defendant New Yorker magazine of a story of the
career of a once-famous child prodigy. See also Molony v. Boy Comics Publishers,
Inc., 277 App. Div. 166, 98 N.Y.S.2d 119 (1st Dep't 1950).
11. A public figure has been defined as "a person who, by his accomplishments,
fame, or mode of living, or by adopting a profession or calling . . . gives the
public a legitimate interest in his doings, his affairs, and his character .. " Cason
v. Bashkin, 159 Fla. 31, 36, 30 So. 2d 635, 638 (1947), or as "anyone who has arrived
at a position where public attention is focused upon him as a person." W. PnossEn,
TORTS 845 (3d ed. 1964).
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and that, in balance with the legitimate public interest, the law
affords his privacy little protection." 2 Once a person has become a
part of the "news,"13 even unwillingly, it is probable that he will
remain in this category the rest of his life,14 for "once an event is
determined to be news the individuals involved are inevitably sub-
ject to coverage." 5 The rationale for this rule is that a legitimate
function of the press is to educate and remind the public of past
history.16 The performance of this function, however, is generally
limited to substantially truthful presentations. 17 In New York, actions
for invasion of privacy have been sustained when a public figure
demonstrates that his character has been fictionalized. 8 In addition
to the invasion of privacy action, decisions have established that a
public figure can maintain a libel action against the publisher of a
false or fictitious statement concerning him. 19 However, in New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan,20 the Supreme Court modified this rule
by holding that a public official may not constitutionally recover
damages for false and defamatory statements about his public conduct
unless he shows that the statements were motivated by actual malice
12. Spahn v. Julian Messner, Inc., 18 N.Y.2d 324, 326, 221 N.E.2d 543, 545, 274
N.Y.S.2d 877, 879 (1966), where baseball pitcher Warren Spahn was awarded
damages for a substantially fictitious biography published by defendant. For earlier
cases holding no right of privacy for a public figure, see Koussevitzky v. Allen, Towne
& Heath, Inc., 188 Misc. 479, 68 N.Y.S.2d 779 (Sup. Ct.), af#'d, 272 App. Div.
759, 69 NY.S.2d 432 (1st Dep't 1947); S. HOFSTADTER & G. HorowiTz, THE BhGirr OF
PRiVACY § 6.5 (1964).
13. "News" has been variously defined in the cases. A New York court has held "a
report of recent occurrences ... is generally understood by the term 'news."' Jenkins
v. News Syndicate Co., 128 Misc. 284, 285, 219 N.Y.S. 196, 198 (Sup. Ct. 1926). It
is said to have "that indefinable quality of interest, which attracts public attention."
Associated Press v. International News Serv., 245 F. 244, 248 (2d Cir. 1917), aff'd,
248 U.S. 215 (1918). "The emphasis . . . is on what is of interest to the public rather
than on what ought to be of interest." Franklin, A Constitutional Problem in Privacy
Protection: Legal Inhibitions on Reporting of Fact, 16 STAN. L. REv. 107, 115 (1963).
14. In Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp., supra note 10, the court held that a 27-year
period of obscurity had not dimmed the public interest in a once famous person.
15. Franklin, supra note 13, at 115. The decisions indicate that "once a man has
become a public figure, or news, he remains a matter of legitimate recall to the
public mind to the end of his days." Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALiF. L. REV. 383, 418
(1960).
16. Prosser, supra note 15 at 418.
17. "The factual reporting of newsworthy persons and events is in the public interest
and is protected. The fictitious is not." Spahn v. Julian Messner, Inc., supra note 12,
at 326, 221 N.E.2d at 545, 274 N.Y.S.2d at 879. "A substantial number of cases have
indicated . . . that a cause of action does arise when the story is dressed up in a
sensational fashion and is 'fictionalized-in other words, when a false impression is
created regarding the plaintiff." Wade, Defamation and the Right of Privacy, 15 VANo.
L. REv. 1093, 1102 (1962).
18. Spahn v. Julian Messner, Inc., supra note 12. See also Silver, supra note 9,
at 555.
19. See W. PnHossan, TonTs 848-49 (3d ed. 1964).
20. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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or made with reckless disregard for their truth.2 The Court held that
state tort law is "state action" within the fourteenth amendment, and
that where such law unduly interferes with freedom of speech or of
the press under the first amendment, it cannot be enforced. 22 Sullivan
was a landmark decision in the law of libel, setting forth, for the first
time, "the extent to which the constitutional protections for speech
and press limit a State's power to award damages in a libel action
brought by a public official against critics of his official conduct."23
In the instant case, the Supreme Court accepted the lower court's
finding that the plaintiff was a public figure substantially without a
right of privacy as far as his hostage experience was concerned,
and it concluded that the article in Life, linking the opening of
a new play to an actual incident, was a matter of public interest.
Rejecting the New York rule permitting recovery when there is
proof of substantial and material fictionalization, 24 the Court reas-
oned that requiring verification of all news articles would present
the grave hazard of discouraging the press from exercising its con-
stitutional right. The Court held that constitutional protections of
speech and press preclude the application of the New York statute
to false reports of matters of public interest, in the absence of a
showing that the defendant published the article with knowledge of
its falsity or with reckless disregard for the truth.21 Mr. Justice Harlan,
concurring in part and dissenting in part, objected to the Court's
extension of the New York Times v. Sullivan rule, on the grounds
that a private individual like the plaintiff lacks the same opportunity
to defend himself publicly against false statements that would be
available to a public official and should therefore be granted greater
protection. Stating that there is a much greater state interest in
protecting persons like Hill than in protecting public officials, he
concluded that the press should not be insulated from sanction by the
21. This decision resolved the dispute as to whether the press should have such a
qualified privilege. See 1 F. HARPER & F. JAXMES, TORTS § 5.26 at 449-50 (1956);
W. PROssER, TORTS 814 (3d ed. 1964); Hallen, Fair Comment, 8 TEXAs L. REv. 41,
62-70 (1929); Noel, Defamation of Public Officers and Candidates, 49 CoLum. L. Rv.
875, 896-97 (1949).
22. Silver, supra note 9, at 553.
23. 376 U.S. at 256.
24. See note 18 supra.
25. Justices Black and Douglas, concurring, found that the first and fourteenth
amendments provide a much wider freedom of the press than that expressed by the
majority. They found that the rule of New York Times is too narrow to provide
adequate protection for this freedom, and concluded that no law should be permitted
which abridges the freedom of speech or freedom of the press in any way.
Mr. Justice Douglas also found that state action abridging freedom of the press is
barred by the first and fourteenth amendments, and concluded that the majority
holding did not provide sufficient protection for the freedom. He concluded that
even a knowingly fictionalized account of an event is in the public domain and
cannot constitutionally be prohibited by a state right of privacy statute.
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first amendment when it creates a severe risk of irremediable harm
to individuals involuntarily exposed to it and powerless to protect
themselves. Chief Justice Warren and justices Fortas and Clark, dis-
senting, based their opinion on the view that since privacy has become
a basic right, the state legislatures may enforce it' by appropriate
legislation. The justices first established that the first amendment
does not bar effective protection of the right of privacy and then
maintained that the majority opinion would greatly weaken this
protection by immunizing the press in areas far beyond the needs
of legitimate news, comment on public persons and events, and the
free discussion of public ideas.
In limiting a state's right to award damages for invasion of privacy,
the Supreme Court in the instant case adopted substantially the same
test as that employed in the New York Times decision. The applica-
bility of that test to an action by a private individual for invasion
of privacy can be determined by examining the reasoning of the
Court in New York Times. The rationale of that decision was based
on the proposition that the first amendment was intended to protect
and promote uninhibited debate on public issues.26 The focus of the
Court on an interest in "public discussion"7 and "free political dis-
cussion to the end that government may be responsive to the will of
the peopl&'2 indicates that its concern was not freedom of the
press in the abstract, but was constructive political and social change
through uninhibited debate. Such an end is clearly not served
through protecting misstatement by the press concerning private
individuals who have been involuntarily and only temporarily thrust
into the public spotlight. Thus, the aims which guided the Court's
decision in New York Times are not applicable to the instant case.
Nonetheless, the majority holding is substantially in accord with
earlier decisions of the New York courts, which adhered to d narrower
interpretation of the right of privacy than have most states.29 After
the development of the privilege to comment on newsworthy persons
and events in New York, which is violated only by substantial fiction-
alization, the lower court decision in the instant case39 was viewed
as a change in the law.3 The reversal by the Supreme Court brings
26. 376 U.S. at 269. The court considered the case "against the background of a
profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be
uninhibited, robust, and wide-open .... " 376 U.S. at 270 (emphasis added).
27. Id. at 270.
28. Id. at 269.
29. See S. HoFsmnTAmn & G. HoRowrrz, supra note 12, at § 12.4. Other states which
have adopted statutes of a similar limited nature are Oklahoma, Utah, and Virginia.
W. PROSsER, TORTS 832 (3d ed. 1964).
30. Hill v. Hayes, 18 App. Div. 2d 485, 240 N.Y.S.2d 286 (1st Dep't 1963), aff'd,
15 N.Y.2d 986, 207 N.E.2d 604, 260 N.Y.S.2d 7 (1965) (mem.).
31. Silver, supra note 9 at 556-57, states that the instant case in the lower court
1967 ] RECENT CASES 1175
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
the case more in line with the authority and the net effect of the
holding on New York law is only a change in the test for recovery
from "substantial fictionalization" to knowledge of the falsity of the
statements or reckless disregard for the truth by the publisher. The
effect on other jurisdictions will be far more severe. As the dissent
points out,3 at least 35 states now recognize the right of privacy
either by decision or by statute.33 In effect, the Supreme Court has
erased whatever standard these courts had established for deter-
mining when an individual's privacy has been invaded by a publica-
tion of false statements and has superimposed the test of this case.
It has done this by applying the first amendment guarantee of free-
dom of the press through the fourteenth amendment. But "[t]he first
amendment cannot be viewed as an absolute command. Its content
involves a constant balancing of competing interests."34 In almost
every jurisdiction, the right of privacy has become a basic individual
right, and the interest of preserving this right must be balanced with
the interest of preserving an unintimidated free press. The conflict of
these interests does not seem to be as severe as the majority makes
it. Generally, the rule has been that true statements may be published
about newsworthy events or private persons. Such a rule offers a
sound balance, preserving the right of the press to report legitimate
news and protecting the individual against false statements which
he might well not be able to adequately rebut publicly. The burden
of making the press check the accuracy of the facts about private
individuals in the news to avoid substantial misstatement does not
seem overly severe. In the instant case, the Court has granted to
the press an immunity which is not necessary and which materially
restricts the individual's right of privacy.
changed the standard and imposed a novel test of newsworthiness in the light of the
leading decision of Sidis v. F-1. Publishing Corp., supra note 10.
32. 385 U.S. at 413.
33. The only states specifically rejecting a right of privacy are Nebraska, in Brunson
v. Ranks Army Stores, 161 Neb. 519, 73 N.W.2d 803 (1955); Rhode Island, in
Henry v. Cherry & Webb, 30 R.I. 13, 73 A. 97 (1909); Texas, e.g., McCullagh v.
Houston Chronicle Publishing Co., 211 F.2d 4 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S.
827 (1954); and Wisconsin, e.g., Yoeckel v. Samonig, 272 Wis. 430, 75 N.W.2d 925
(1956). See W. PRoss~a, ToaRTs 831-32 (3d ed. 1964).
34. Pedrick, Freedom of the Press and the Law of Libel: The Modern Revised
Translation, 49 CoRNELL L.Q. 581, 595 (1964).
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